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What is the function of the distinction between ground and existence, which 'the 
naturephilosophy of our time first established in science'?1 And what does it tell us concerning 
that distinction that it issues from the Naturphilosophie, rather than from the ‘logic’ Schelling is 
supposed never to have written? If seeking the ‘function’ of this distinction seems dissonant with 
the worldly character of Schelling’s investigations, it is part of the richness of that work that, for 
example, nevertheless essence (Wesen) is ‘functionally’ determined as having 'two operative 
modes (zwei Wirkungsweisen)',2 while ground is similarly functionally capable of 'self-operating (für-
sich-wirken des Grundes)'.3 
 It is thus clear that Schelling understands essence as consisting in operations. Yet an 
essence is not simple but complex, combining 'two modes of operation (zwei Wirkungsweisen)'.4 It 
is into these two modes that the distinction divides essential operations: once and if one obtains, 
ground is a self-operating, centrifugal vortex, against which existence is the centripetal 
distribution of structures. Essences, therefore, neither serve on Schelling’s view to identify entities 
or kinds, nor to ground necessitation relations amongst entities or kinds.5 Essence is entity-smearing, 
both forwards and backwards. Schelling holds that essence smears forwards because it bears the 
consequentialist weight Fine, for instance, contemporarily accords ‘essence’: 
 
if a given property is essential, then so is the property of having that property; and hence 
an interest in the given ‘lower level’ property will transfer to an interest in the derived 
‘higher level’ property.6 
 
                                                 
1   F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit 
zusammenhängende Gegenstände, hereafter Freiheitsschrift. All references to Schelling’s works are to Schellings Werke, ed. 
K.F.A. Schelling, Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856-61, referenced by division and volume (I/1-10, II/1-4), 
followed by page number. For the Freiheitsschrift, I use James Gutmann’s translation (Chicago: Open Court, 1986), 
hereafter PI. Here SW I/7: 357; PI 31. 
2   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7: 409; PI 90 
3   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7: 381; PI 58 
4   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 409; PI 90 
5   George Molnar presents both claims in his contribution to contemporary ‘neo-essentialist’ 
philosophy of nature, Powers. A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 38-9: 'The grounding of 
essence in identity explains the difference between essential properties and necessary properties: the inessential 
properties of an object are not merely its accidental ones, but include all those it has necessarily yet not by virtue of 
what it is.' Neo-essentialists argue that a property is essential, however, when it consists of a causal power that is, as 
Stephen Mumford points out, 'a source of such [de re] necessity' as the world contains. See his ‘Kinds, Essence, 
Powers’ in Alice Drewery, ed., Metaphysics in Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 47-62, here 49. 
6   Kit Fine, ‘Essence and modality’, in Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1-16; here 1. For a discussion 
of Fine’s distinction between ‘constitutive’ and ‘consequentialist’ essence, see Kathrin Koslicki, ‘Varieties of 
ontological dependence’, in Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, eds. Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the 




That is to say, a property’s essentiality obtains once having it obtains. Yet in what is it that a 
property obtains? Notably, in Fine’s formulation, properties attach not to objects but to 
essentiality, where essentiality generates derivative orders of essentiality. For this same reason, 
however, essence ‘smears’ insuperably backwards: since no object or thing individually grounds 
or backstops essence, the latter’s ground-seeking function is required to descend to a depth 
augmented with each augmentation of the consequent or derivative series. Accordingly, when 
ground exists, not only does it do so consequently. Neither does an existing ground terminate 
the grounding procedure, but merely places an additional stratum, a 'resistant' or Gegenstand, in its 
way. It is from this that the conclusion may be drawn that, since essence exceeds existence 
‘descendentally’7 just as insuperably consequent existence makes its antecedent into the base for 
its ascent, that 'the essence of ground, or of the existent, can only be precedent to all ground, 
that is, the absolute considered as such, the unground.'8 
 On this account, essence is neither the substrate of its properties nor the sum of its 
appearances, but is rather an operation by which existents are smeared towards a past that is 
without them (grounding) and a future in which they are not (assuming only that something 
arises). It is because the operations of ground and existence are nonfinal, both insofar as 
operations are not determined by having a futural target state, but rather essence itself divides 
operationally; and insofar as no operation is exhausted in its outcome, that an ontology for which 
existents are local constituents entails ‘non-objectal’, nonfinal or the environing of all strata – 'the 
absolute considered as such'. 
 Consequently, amongst the ‘resistants’ (thus removing the ‘thingish’ prejudice inherent in 
translating Gegenstände as 'objects', which Schelling criticises9) on which this ontological sequence 
co-depends (zusammenhängt), are the aesthetic10 geneses comprising ‘fact’ and ‘feeling’, the 
ontological sequencing chain ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’, the emergence chain ‘dependency’ 
(Abhängigkeit) and ‘autonomy’ (Selbständigkeit) and the generation of orders or Stufenfolge11 that 
positions the ‘later’ within the ‘earlier’ 'revelations of nature'.12 In this sense, the dividing of 
ground from existence is expressed ontologically as the environing of existence, without prejudice as 
to the manner or mode of existence (e.g., logical, physical, mythological, revelatory, and so 
forth), and such that the investigation of freedom is insuperably bonded not to existence as a 
                                                 
7   In Book One, Part One of the Philosophie der Offenbarung (hereafter Begründung), SW II/3, 151n, tr. 
Bruce Matthews, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy. The Berlin Lectures (hereafter GP). Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2007, 196n, Schelling divides negative from positive philosophy insofar as the former 'is only a 
philosophia ascendens (ascending from below), from which one immediately realizes that it can have only a logical 
significance, whereas positive philosophy is a philosophia descendens (descending from above).' 
8   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 407-8, PI 88-9, t.m. 
9   Freiheitsschrift, SW I/7, 349; PI 22, t.m.: 'The error of his [Spinoza’s – IHG] system is by no 
means due to the fact that he posits all things in God, but to the fact that they are things – to the abstract conception of 
worldly essences [Weltwesen].' See also Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie, ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Turin: Bottega 
d’Erasmo, 1972), 94: “Object [Gegenstand] and resistance [Widerstand] are at bottom one and the same word.” 
10   I take ‘aesthetic’ in the pre-Kantian sense to mean the science of perception, as it was used by 
Baumgarten, in Metaphysics , translated Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers. London: Bloomsbury, 2013, e.g., §533: 
'The science of knowing and presenting <proponendi> with regard to the senses is AESTHETICS', a usage recently 
revived by Maurizio Ferraris. See his Introduction to New Realism (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
11   Primarily associated with the naturephilosophy, Stufenfolge recurs in the middle works, e.g. in The 
Ages of the World (hereafter AW), SW I/8, 232, 324; AW 22, 93, both of which concern nature in general, in the first 
instance, and organic beings in the second, and then again at SW I/8, 333; AW 100, where one obtains linking 
creating, forming and making. Schelling continues its use in the 1830s (SW I/10, 241) through to the 1840s and ‘50s 
(SW I/10, 311, 330, 364-5, 382; SW II/1 76, 411, 492, 529; SW II/2 451). 
12   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 415; PI 98: 'We have an earlier revelation than any written one – nature.' 
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whole – since if there is existence, it can only be if environed – but to what he calls 'the 
innermost centre of nature'.13 What this centre might be, or how this centre arises, what occupies 
it, was the animating question of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century life sciences, on 
the one hand, and a continuation, therefore, of the investigation concerning the origin of 
motion, the arche kineseos, Schelling began in On the World Soul, on the other.14 But it is also the 
basal problem of fundamentality or the 'essence of grounds'. Schelling’s answer, we may 
extrapolate, would position the ontological co-dependency of ground and existent as itself 
consequent on an insuperably ungrounded state antecedent to those operations. This illustrates 
the environing or field ontology operative even in the Freiheitsschrift’s title, which positions its 
focus – the essence of human freedom – within series of resistants, including creation and primal 
being, each of which, if the thesis holds, is environed in turn. The present essay seeks to outline 
the ontology of environed operations developed in the Freiheitsschrift. Roughly, no operation, not 
even Urseyn, is so primitive as not to be environed, such that no operation may satisfy the 
context from which operations issue. It is for the (non-fundamental) reason that there are 
operations at all that there is no 'environment of all environments'.15 
 
 
1. The Positive is the Whole 
 
Why then, it might be asked, does 'the whole' enjoy a positive valency in the Freiheitsschrift? The 
work’s title makes it clear that the work first addresses what resists or informs the environment 
of a free, that is, an autonomous (selbständiger) operation. Only then do inquiries proceed into 
what the essence of a free act must be. Since an inquiry is philosophical, we are told, just when it 
relates a concept to a 'systematic worldview' or to 'the world as a whole',16 we must either 
conclude that the whole is incomplete or that it is itself environed, i.e., that the world as a whole 
issues from an environment it does not include. If nothing that is can be exempted from what 
Schelling here calls 'the world', such a world must be susceptible to augmentation by whatever it 
is that is. This is why 'world', as Schelling indicates in the Weltalter drafts, is neither the physical 
cosmos nor the transcendental ideal, but a copula.17 Order is insuperably environed by ataxia, the 
'disorder of the forces'.18 
Yet the work is more usually taken as the pinion of a Schellingian Wende19 between the 
early and late periods, a turning towards an existentialist20 or a dialectical materialist21 rejection of 
                                                 
13   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 362; 37 
14   Von der Weltseele SW I/2: 345-584, tr. I. H. Grant in Of the World Soul and Other Naturephilosophical 
Writings. Forthcoming: Albany: SUNY, 2015. 
15   Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, tr. Joseph D. O’Neill. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010, 135: '… all these different environments are fostered and borne 
along by the One that is inaccessible to all environments forever. Forever unknowable behind all the worlds it 
produces, the subject – Nature – conceals itself.' 
16   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 336-7; PI 7-8 
17   F. W. J. Schelling, Die Weltalter. Fragmente. Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813, ed. Manfred Schröter. 
Munich: Beck, 1946, 225. 
18   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 370; PI 46; cf. Philosophie der Offenbarung II/4, 180-181, where generation 
entails participation in and resistance to “worldly ataxia”. 
19   Xavier Tilliette, Une philosophie en devenir (2nd edition, II vols, Paris: Vrin, 1992, I: 504-5) presents 
Fuhrmans’ claim, in Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1954, 75-127), that a Böhme-influenced 
Wende occurs in the Weltalterphilosophie after 1806. Fuhrmans notes its persistence in, e.g., Habermas’ discussion of a 
Schellingian Kehre in his 1963 essay ‘Dialektischer Idealismus im Übergang zum Materialismus’, in Theorie und Praxis 
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the intervening decade’s Naturphilosophie, a rejection evidenced by the conspicuous elision of the 
naturephilosophical works in the volume crowned by the Freiheitsschrift and booted by Vom Ich. 
This interpretive strategy would reduce the problems of essence, nature and causation either to 
symptoms protesting against, even as they attest to, Schelling’s own 'inner mutation'22 or to a 
metaphysic of freedom and 'positions of the will'.23 
The re-emergence of the problem of freedom in 1809 gives us no reason to assume such 
a turning unless freedom is alien to nature,24 separable from the world as a whole. Yet because a 
philosophy of freedom can 'only be developed from the fundamental principles of a true 
naturephilosophy',25 and is 'complete' only when it demonstrates 'how each successive process more 
closely approaches the essence of nature, until… the innermost centre is disclosed'. What is this 
disclosure, this revelation? Schelling simply asserts that its disclosure will be consequent upon the 
'highest division of forces',26 a division issuing from and in essence, though essence has 
irreducibly two 'Wirkungsweisen'.27 That essence is self-dividing is acknowledged at the outset of 
the work. The philosophy of nature develops because this identity is not the extensional identity 
of the two (x=x), but what each differentially is (the identity in x is the identity in y, and since 
identity cannot differ from itself, the identity between x and y is at once its third iteration and, 
therefore, the additional assertion of the identity in each of these three). Hence the 'antithesis in 
the pure identity of nature' from which Schelling has the construction of nature issue in 179928 
remains insuperable in the Freedom essay. Moreover, as the 'nature that permeates everything',29 
identity is maximally ubiquitous30 and therefore not identical to any emergent.31 
The renegotiation of an a posteriori naturalism with the apparent apriority of essence 
remains an unfamiliar element of the Freiheitsschrift. Yet such an understanding of essence is 
falsely attributed to Schelling, apriority itself being consequent upon the activity of essence since 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Berlin: Luchterhand, 1969, 108-161 ). Sean McGrath’s ‘Introduction’ to The Dark Ground of Spirit (New York: 
Routledge, 2012) offers a concise account of the various positions taken on this issue and the reasons for them. 
20   Karl Jaspers, Schelling: Größe und Verhängnis (Munich: Piper, 1955). 
21   Habermas, op. cit. 
22   Tilliette 1992 I: 510. Sean McGrath, in The Dark Ground of Spirit. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2012, 29, criticises Žižek’s attempt, in The Irreducible Remainder. London: Verso, 1996, not only to provide 
a psychoanalytic reading of his works, but 'more accurately, a psychoanalysis of Schelling'. 
23   Martin Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit, Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 1971, 133. 
24   Such textual support as exists for it consists in two claims at SW I/7, 333-4; PI 3-4. (1) That all 
his previous work is declared to have been naturephilosophy. This claim implies but does not entail that the 
Freiheitsschrift is itself not such a work. (2) That it is the first work wherein 'the author offers… his conception of… 
[the] philosophy… of the Ideal' is required by misattributions of claims concerning the ideal part of philosophy to 
the naturephilosophy. In other words, it is to the completed system of philosophy, of which his previous works are 
'fragments', that the Freiheitsschrift is devoted and that requires the 'overcoming of many a prejudice' (SW I/7, 335, PI 
5), rather than to some philosophically partisan turning from nature to freedom. I agree with McGrath, op. cit., 33, 
when he notes that the Freiheitsschrift announces 'no axial divergence' from the naturephilosophical concerns still 
dominant in the Identity philosophy. 
25   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 357; PI 31 
26   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 362; PI 37 
27   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 409; PI 90 
28   Einleityung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie oder über den Begriff der spekulativen Physik, 
SW I/3, 308n; tr. Keith R. Peterson in First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature. Albany: SUNY, 2004: 219n. 
29   Begründung SW II/3, 6; GP, 92-3. 
30   Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie, SW I/4, 120, tr. Michael Vater and David W. Wood in The 
Philosophical Rupture Between Fichte and Schelling. Selected Texts and Correspondance (1800-1802). Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2012 (hereafter PR), 149: 'absolute identity has surely never ceased being identity and everything 
that is, is considered in itself – not just the appearance of absolute identity but identity itself.' 
31    Darstellung SW I/4, 119; PR 148: 'With respect to being in itself, nothing has come into being.' 
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'anything the essence of which exceeds actuality is temporal'.32 It is only because essence exceeds 
or 'overpowers' actuality but remains nature, that a past emerges where the a priori is as ‘having 
been’, as a dimension of essence.33 Unfamiliarity with the Freiheitsschrift’s dynamics or powers-
naturalism is itself therefore consequent upon any account of that project that withdraws 
freedom from nature, that is, separates it from the system with which it con-sists. Thus, although 
Schelling presents the Freiheitsschrift as his first 'completely definite' account of the philosophy of 
the Ideal,34 suggesting an abstraction of a logical from a cosmological order in which the implicit 
withdrawal of freedom from nature would already be previsioned, even the understanding – 
undeniably Ideal – is introduced as having as 'the division of forces' as its 'first effect in nature'.35 
How the understanding can have effects in nature at all, how the word can be 'spoken out into it',36 is 
the problem that drives the Freiheitsschrift to continue the investigation of the involution of 
cognitive in cosmological systems that forms the starting point of the 1810 Stuttgarter 
Privatvorlesungen. Asking the apparently transcendental question of how a system is possible at all, 
Schelling offers the naturalistic response that 'long before man decided to create a system, there 
already existed one: the System der Welt.'37 Calling this a transcendental naturalism does not go far 
enough, since if the conditions of possibility for systematising, whether cosmogonic or 
ideogenic, are nature, then nature transcendentalises. Schelling’s naturalism is not reductive, that 
is, but inflationary just if nature consists in 'additional elements'. For free- as for nature-
philosophy, a cognitive system may be Ideal for and in the understanding, but the understanding 
is consequent upon a cosmos (itself consequent or insuperably environed) wherein it arises. 
If freedom is treated apart from the nexus it forms with Gegenstände, philosophical 
inquiries into a nature full of powers, into the theory of self-replicating operations, and into the 
origin and efficacy of the understanding are occluded beneath the self-justification of a 
philosophy of the Ideal premised on elimination: everything not in the understanding is without 
reality. The 'irreducible remainder'38 makes this eliminative idealism impossible. Nature is 
restored to the Freiheitsschrift when attention is paid to the details of its revised theory of essence 
and form, central to the Identity philosophy. We are concerned therefore in what follows with 
the concepts or functions proper to essence and form in Schelling’s middle philosophy. 
 
 
2. Essence and Potency: the Law of the Ground 
 
The essence [Wesen] of the I is freedom, that is, it is not thinkable except inasmuch as it posits 
itself by its own absolute power [aus absoluter Selbstmacht], not, indeed, as any kind of 
something, but as sheer I. This freedom can be determined positively, because we want to 
                                                 
32   Über das Verhältniß des Realen und Idealen in der Natur oder Entiwcklung der ersten Grundsätze der 
Naturphilosophie an den Principien der Schwere und des Lichts (hereafter Band), SW I/2, 364. 
33   Schelling presents the origin of the past in the Weltalter (SW I/8, 259; AW 43): 'The person who 
does not overcome himself or herself has no past, or rather never comes out of the past and lives constantly in the 
past.' 
34   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 334; PI 4 
35   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 361; PI 36 
36   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 395; PI 74, t.m. 
37    Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen SW I/7, 421 (herafter Privatvorlesungen) tr. Thomas Pfau, in Idealism and 
the Endgame of Theory. Three Essays by F. W. J. Schelling. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, hereafter 
IE, 197 
38   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 360; PI 34 
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attribute freedom not to a thing in itself but to the pure I as posited by itself…. No 
objective freedom belongs to the I because it is not an object [Objekt] at all. As soon as 
we try to determine the I as an object, it withdraws into the most restricted sphere, under 
the conditions of the interdependence of objects – its freedom and independence 
disappear. An object is possible only through another object, and only inasmuch as it is 
bound to conditions. Freedom is only through itself and it encompasses [umfaßt] the 
infinite.39 
 
He who has reflected upon freedom and necessity has found for himself that these two 
principles must be united in the absolute: freedom, because the absolute acts from its own 
unconditioned power [das Absolute aus unbedingter Selbstmacht… handelt], and necessity 
because it acts only according to the laws of its own being, the inner necessity of its 
essence.40 
 
The inclusion of the two essays from which the above quotations are drawn, alongside 
the first publication of the Freiheitsschrift in the 1809 Philosophische Schriften, seems at first sight to 
support a Wende account pinioned on the rejection of the naturephilosophy. The degree of 
consonance between those works’ concerns and those of the Freiheitsschrift is indeed striking: just 
as the Freiheitsschrift maps the system of essence according to which each has its being 'only in 
another' and 'none is without the other',41 Vom Ich conceives freedom as the degree of Selbstmacht 
proper to an essence, while essences are differentiated according to the degree to which their 
power or sphere of activity is restricted by another. With this, Schelling moves decisively from 
Fichte’s universalisation of activity under the transcendental pinion of the I, insofar as no single 
state satisfies essence’s operative modes. The contrasting of the 'inner necessity' by which an 
essence acts, with the conditioned 'interdependence' of objects, prompts the suggestion that the 
Philosophische Briefe amount to a first draft of the solution to the problem the Freiheitsschrift 
undertakes thirteen years later. Each of the two passages stipulates an asymmetrical 
proportionality between power and its conditioned or restricted spheres, such that the free power 
against which degrees of restriction are measured is 'non-finite', 'unconditioned', 'positive' or 
'absolute' and 'acts out of unconditioned Selbstmacht'.  
 Yet the Freiheitsschrift is not only concerned with the fact and feeling of freedom, i.e., with 
its consequent actuality: the vertical of freedom arises, as it were, only through the plane of 
system-forming interconnecting essences or 'the positive'. Nor is it with the substance of the 
unruly as separate from the understanding that the Freiheitsschrift is concerned but, as Vom Ich 
indicates, with essence and the objects with which essence bonds. Where Vom Ich sets Selbstmacht 
                                                 
39   Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen, SW I/1, 179 
(hereafter Vom Ich); tr. Fritz Marti in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. Four Early Essays (1794-1796). Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press, 1980 (hereafter UH), 84. 
40   Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus (hereafter Briefe), SW I/1, 330-331; tr. UH, 189. 
41   The first such claim characterises finite being according to Spinoza as 'necessarily in another' (SW 
I/7, 340; PI 12, my emphasis) while Schelling makes the second claim with regard to the organic individual as 
'something that has become, only through another' (SW I/7, 346; PI 12), which echoes Schelling’s own claims in the 
Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie, that 'nothing individual has the ground of its existence in itself' (SW I/4, 130; 
PR 155). The third claim explicates the consequence of this model of grounding: 'In the circle from which 
everything becomes it is no contradiction that what generates the one is in turn generated by it. Here there is no first 
and no last since everything is reciprocally presupposed, none is the other and none is without the other' (SW I/7, 
358; PI 33). 
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against Objekte, the Freiheitsschrift recasts the latter as Gegenstände, that is, as the modes of activity 
forming the power they stand against. While Vom Ich had already executed the move from the 
Timaeus essay’s Substanz to Wesen, the Freiheitsschrift more fully develops essence as the 'vital 
bond'42 of the unlimited X in the schlechthin unlimited, of the restricted in and against the positive 
and the positive in the restricted, whereby spheres of activity are logically identical to their 
restriction and essence is their dynamic articulation. The law of the ground emerges from this 
common medium. 
It is important to note that the topology in which these restricted spheres form is itself 
unbounded. In terms of the later Identity philosophy on which the Freiheitsschrift draws, this is 
'das All'43 in which power is positive when it creates the positions from which spheres arise. That 
the totality of positions fall within the whole is due less to the transcendental or ideal character 
of totality than to the disorder that by definition exceeds, environs, and informs the positions or 
dimensions of a power. Hence the antithesis of the free and the restricted does not map on to an 
underlying antithesis of what acts and what is acted on or against, nor onto a difference in kind 
such as between Selbstmacht and Objekte but rather, according to the theory of the proposition in 
the Freiheitsschrift, it itself maps what is 'positive' in both the unbounded and the restricted. 
According to this theory, to determine 'positively' means to determine kata dunamin or according 
to power,44 a determination differentially expressed in the proposition. ‘A is B’, that is, means 
that the positive in A is the positive in B (identity as power),45 but in different degrees (difference 
in position and potency), since B is not by itself but by virtue of the A in it.46 Hence the 
proposition is irreversible (Schelling’s law of identity states, among other things, that (A=B) ≠ 
(B=A)47 so that the posited always creates direction in the positive, or the affirmed in the 
affirming. The proposition is also the expression of the interconnection (Zusammenhang) of 
essences and Gegenstände, because nothing individual exists except 'in another'48 that stands against 
and so forms its sphere of activity. In consequence, spheres arise as the restricted in the whole or 
as 'the ataxia of forces', while 
                                                 
42   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 362: 'lebendige Band'; PI: 37: 'living nexus'. 
43   That identity is the universe is stated in the Darstellung (SW I/4, 129; PR 154) and becomes an 
important theme throughout Schelling’s subsequent engagements with identity and nature, returning in the 
Freiheitsschrift to the relation of Spirit and the Potenzen. Further substantiating the Freiheitsschrift’s claim that all his 
previous work was naturephilosophy (SW I/7, 333; PI 3), following the extensive ‘Supplement to the Introduction’ 
to the Ideen zur einer Philosophie der Natur of 1803 (SW I/2, 57-72; IPN 43-55), Schelling added the essay ‘Über das 
Verhältniß des Realen und Idealen in der Natur’ to preface the 1806 edition of the Von der Weltseele (SW I/2, 359-360) and 
retained it in the third edition of 1809. The theme is further developed in the Würzburg lectures of 1804, System der 
gesamten Philosophie und der Naturephilosophie insbesondere and the two sets of Naturephilosophischen Aphorismen (1806) 
drawn from them (especially SW I/7, 147-8) and published in the Jarhbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft.  
44   On the constant conjunction of kata dunamin and kata phusin in Plato and its legacy in Schelling, 
see chapter 2 of my Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London and New York: Continuum, 2006). 
45   That a relation is 'identical in the essence of Being and different only in potency' only therefore 
entails an analogy between two processes (ground and existence are related as gravity and light), as Heidegger claims 
(1971: 138), when ground is not thought, as Heidegger notes Schelling does think (1971: 133), kata dunamin or 
according to power, which is the 'essence of absolute identity' and 'the ground of reality' (SW I/4, 145; PR 164). 
46   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 341; PI 13: 'if one puts forward the proposition: “The perfect is the 
imperfect”, the meaning is this: the imperfect is not due to that through which it is imperfect, but rather through the 
perfect that is in it'. 
47   Schelling states the 'real meaning of the law of the identity' (SW I/7, 342; PI 14) as 'no sort of 
combination can transform what is by nature derivative into what is by nature original' (SW I/7, 340; PI 12), since 
the copula in the proposition bonds antecedent to consequent (SW I/7, 342; PI 14). The irreversibility of its factors 
therefore follows from that law. 




the positive is always the whole or the unity; what stands against it [das ihm entgegenstehende] 
is separation of the whole, discord, ataxia of forces.49 
 
 Accordingly, since A is not positive unless it has antecedence (disorder) and 
consequences, it is not the case that essence consists only in the positive rather than the posited, 
in which case essence would be power without consequent, which is contradictory.50 Essence, 
then, is a function, an articulation of power. That the positive requires consequences has as its 
consequence that the positive, articulated by essence as the production or separation of existing 
and grounding, acquires its antecedence to dynamic ataxia consequent upon the latter’s introduction. 
At the same time, the positive remains in the restricted as the articulation of the whole. 
This is why, for Schelling,51 essence or Wesen does not occupy 'the dimension… of 
substantiality' or substantia by which Boethius and Cicero translated Aristotle’s ούσια,52 but, 
according to Jean-François Courtine, the 'dimension of Existenz or ekstasis'.53 Existence is a 
feature of dimension rather than of a state of being because, while Wesen involves existence, it is 
not, by virtue of its additionally having the grounding of existence as a function, reducible to it. 
For Schelling, it is in the mixture of the divisible and the indivisible,54 in becoming,55 that essence 
consists,56 making it synonymous with nature for Plato57 as for Schelling,58 while extending also to 
the purely intelligible in the former case. Yet such tensions are not reducibly ideal or conceptual. 
On the contrary, it is such divisions as these that, while they render Wesen or essence as thinkable 
only through power, they also entail its inseparability from existing. The Freiheitsschrift thus 
follows the Presentation in giving essence the basic form of the separation of ground from 
existence, or better, the movements of a ground-depositing exceeded by an 'outward going',59 each 
                                                 
49   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 370; PI 46 
50   'If the dependent or the consequent were not independent [there] would be a dependency 
without a dependent, a consequence without a consequent (consequential absque consequente) and, thus, no real 
consequence; that is, the whole concept would be self-eliminating' (SW I/7, 346; PI 18-19). 
51   If in the 1794 Timaeus, ed. Hartmut Buchner (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 
1994), 'substance of the unruly' (1994: 69) remains Aristotelian despite its focus on the problem of Platonic matter, 
by 1809, Schelling’s Wesen has become more Platonic than Aristotelian. By 1854, however, Schelling’s Einleitung in der 
Philosophie der Mythologie, SW II/1, 362, cautions 'that ούσια in Aristotle is not Wesen (essentia) as in Plato; the 
Scholastics rightly avoided this and set substantia in its place.' 
52   See Jean-François Courtine’s rich analysis of Boethius’ and Augustine’s translations of 
Aristotelian ούσια in ‘Les traductions latines d’ΟΥΣΙΑ et la comprehension romano-stoïcienne de l’être’, in Les 
categories de l’être (Paris: PUF, 2003), 11-77. For brief but decisive remarks on Cicero’s translations of Platonic ούσια, 
see Carlos Lévy, ‘Cicero and the Timaeus’, in Gretschen J. Reydams-Schils, ed., Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon (Notre 
Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 104-5.  
53   Courtine 2003, op. cit., 91. 
54   Cf. Lévy, op.cit., p.105: 'ούσια is used [in Plato] to signify the indivisible being as well as the 
divisible kind and the mixture of both. Despite some real difficulties in Plato’s text, it does display an indisputable 
coherence [in referring to both] the real being that never changes and… [to those] ούσιαι that are less perfect from 
an ontological point of view.'  
55   Plato, Philebus 26d8, addresses the 'γένεσιν είς ούσίαν' the birth or coming into being of what is. 
56   Gernot Böhme translates Plato’s ούσια as Seinsbestand throughout his Platons theoretische Philosophie 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000). 
57   Lévy (op.cit., p.105) remarks that, at Phaedrus 245c-e, 'Plato uses ούσια and φύσις as synonymous', 
switching between 'ψυχής φύσεως' and 'ψυχής ούσίαν'. 
58   E.g. SW I/7, 358, PI 32, where 'nature', as the 'ground of God’s existence' is an 'indivisible but 
inseparable essence'. 
59   SW II/1, 369, for example, characterises essence as what surpasses and what establishes grounds, 
i.e. as hinausgehend and as zu Grunde liegend. 
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of which is a Gegenstand, i.e., not an object for but a 'standing-against' involved in the other, 
forming consequent spheres of activity according to power. Essence, that is, is forged in the 
division or 'real antithesis'60 of ground and existence, acquiring its form from the forces in 
dynamic tension one with another, so that all Wesen is Mittelwesen61 and what is true of the 
'essence of man' is true of all essences: each is 'its own act'.62 
Power is not therefore a simple case of possibility acquiring creative potency where it 
does not yet overlap with actuality because, as Schelling writes, 'possibility does not entail 
actuality, and this is really the main object in question'.63 Rather than any such transition between 
the possible and the actual (the actuality of possibility does not entail a change in the state of 
being of the possible), Schelling insists that it is impossible to 'wrest actuality from potency'.64 
Potency is its own positive; it becomes, in the Philosophie der Mythologie, an 'infinite potentia existendi 
[…] ein bloßes Können enthaltende Wesen'65 whose being is to be 'by its nature… a leaping towards 
being'.66 It is because what the later Schelling calls Seynkönnen and what the Freiheitsschrift call 
'primal being' or 'willing'67 remains on the verge of being by nature that the Freiheitsschrift requires 'a 
completed philosophy of nature'. The question of possibility, of the ontology of possibility, can 
only be answered, that is, by a philosophy of nature that, to be complete, must include power 
without reducing it to what is ‘potentially actual’ or, in the Freiheitsschrift’s terms to a consequent 
that eliminates what is positive in Potenz. The task of that philosophy is not to discover the 
essence behind, beneath or before the essence of human freedom but to plumb the 'depths of 
the ground of nature' and to disclose the 'innermost centre' of all effective being or Wesen, to 
ground position in power and dimension in position. As to the problem of what grounds power 
or force, which the Darstellung makes 'the essence of absolute identity' and the 'ground of 
reality',68 neither this identification of ground and power nor the grounding of power in the 
essence of ground are viable, since the former begs the question and the latter is regressive. For 
just as 'the essence of ground… can only be antecedent to all ground',69 i.e., cannot be ground 
itself, neither is power self-grounding nor has it, qua 'ground of reality', some other, prior ground 
on which to rest: the essence of power opens onto ungrounding. 
This is why the Un- or Urgrund is a naturephilosophical problem, since the inquiry into 
the principles by which dimensionality issues from what is without and therefore prior to all 
dimension and position amounts to an inquiry into how nature comes into being. It may be 
stated thus: what is the dimension on which dimensionality is itself consequent? The result of 
ungrounding is precisely that no X may satisfy that antecedent from which X’s issue. Thus, 
creation is not reducible to theogony in the Freiheitschrift. God is not the whole of creation since 
the ground he contains has other consequents. Similarly, the problem of freedom concerns not 
                                                 
60   This was a constant of Schelling’s account of coming into being since Von der Weltseele: 'real 
antithesis is possible only between things of one kind and common origin', SW I/2, 397. 
61   Philosophie und Religion (hereafter Religion) SW I/6, 46; tr. Klaus Ottmann, Philosophy and Religion 
(hereafter PaR). Putnam: Spring, 2010, 34. 
62   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 385; PI 63 
63   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 373; PI 49  
64   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 390; PI 68, t.m. 
65   Philosophie der Mythologie, Erstes Buch (Monotheismus), SW II/2, 49-50 
66   Begründung SW II/3, 102; GP, 160 
67   Freiheitschrift SW I/7, 350; PI 24 
68   'Das Wesen des absolutes Identität, insofern sie unmittelbar Grund von Realität ist, ist Kraft', 
Darstellung, SW I/4, 145; PR 164. 
69   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 407; PI 88-89, t.m. 
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only its human essence, but also, since freedom’s roots must lie 'in the independent ground of 
nature',70 in the 'will of the ground'71 or its 'self-operation',72 and so in essence in general: if true 
of one essence, that is, then true of all. The question of freedom is recast therefore as that of the 
self-operative range of essence, giving sense to Schelling’s identification of alle Wesen with alle 
Möglichkeiten:73 essential operative range is actual power. A nature comprising essential operations 
is therefore one that is primordially a Potenzustand, a not-being in the depths,74 an 'infinite potentia 
existendi as mere potency',75 or the pre-dimensional, 'placeless',76 'groundless essence'77 never 
recoverable as ground and existence for anything grounded. In other words, if nature is creation, 
its inexistence is entailed. 
 The Freiheitsschrift therefore inherits the early accounts of freedom’s essence as requiring an 
ontology of power without position or thing, the ground of power without which creation would 
neither be ‘of’ something nor ‘from’ any dimension of being, as well as the trajectory introduced 
into being by existence. While the meaning of Schelling’s 'essence' or Wesen is complex,78 the 
Freiheitsschrift builds on a structure whose outlines are glimpsed already in Vom Ich and in the 
Philosophische Briefe; namely, that an essence is free when its unconditioned power results in its 
self-positing. Essence, that is, acts or operates just when position is consequent upon power. 
Since the establishment of position issues from (power) and in (consequent), or has two 
trajectories, essence acts according to two operative modes (Wirkungsweisen), as ground and as existence.79 
This 'law of the ground'80 is universal throughout the Freiheitsschrift’s ontology, clearly marked in 
its discussions of logic,81 of the understanding,82 organism,83 determination84 and order.85 
                                                 
70   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 371; PI 47, t.m. 
71   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 375; PI 52, t.m. 
72   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 379; PI 56 
73   Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten, SW II/1, 585 
74   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 405; PI 86 
75   Philosophie der Mythologie, SW II/2, 49 
76   ‘Über das Verhältniß des Realen und Idealen in der Natur’, SW I/2, 364 
77   Ibid, SW I/2, 378 
78   See Jason M. Wirth’s concise and nuanced analysis of essence in relation to the time-metaphysics 
of the Weltalter, in his Translator’s Introduction’ to his version of that work AW, xxxi: 'For Schelling, das Wesen 
names the tension between present being (existence) and the simultaneous intimation of that which is as no longer 
being (the past) and that which is as not yet being (the future)…. The Wesen holds together what has being and what 
is, but which does not have being.' The temporal emphasis in this account of what Schelling elsewhere calls 'the 
Wesen in time is the universal centre-point' (SW I/2, 365), tallies with Hegel’s account of Wesen in the Encyclopaedia 
Logic as 'the past sublated and conserved' (§112 1991: 176), or mediated immediacy. Rather than explaining essence 
by temporality, the Freiheitsschrift explains temporality or the reciprocal motions of antecedence and consequence, by 
essence. 
79   '[O]ne essence actually divides itself in its two modes of operation into two essences…, in one 
merely ground for existence and in the other merely essence.' (SW I/7, 409; PI 90, t.m.). The German reads, '…das 
eine Wesen in seinen zwei Wirkungsweisen sich wirklich in zwei Wesen schedet…, in dem einen bloß  Grund zur Existenz, in dem 
andern bloß Wesen.' 
80   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 346; PI 18, t.m. 
81   The 'law of the ground' states that '[i]n the relation of subject and predicate [… is] that of ground 
and consequence' (SW I/7, 345-6; PI 18). Note also Schelling’s reuse of the categories of the affirming and the 
affirmed, from the Würzburg System (1804) and the two sets of Naturephilosophical Aphorisms (1806), as ground and 
consequent (SW I/7, 340; PI 12). 
82   'The understanding is born in the genuine sense in that which is without understanding' (SW I/7, 
360; PI 34, t.m.). 
83   'Every organic individual exists, as something that has become, only through another' (SW I/7, 
346; PI 18). 
84   'Dependence does not determine… and says only that the dependent… can be a consequence 




According to that law, Wesen is not therefore 'thing'86 but division antecedent to consequent 
division, the wiederholte Entfaltung87 of the 'vital bond which arises in division' such that 
consequents are consequents to the extent they are not that upon which they are consequents, so 
that 'at each point of division of forces a new essence emerges from nature'.88 In the sense that 
essence divides but does not separate forces;89 essence arises as consequent upon antecedent, 
determining the latter as the antecedent that it becomes. Identity is creative90 because its essence 
is 'power' or 'force [Kraft]',91 to which it belongs to differentiate: ground from existence, original 
from derived, antecedent from consequent. While therefore identity itself is the universe,92 the 
operations of essence ensure that nature 'is everything that lies beyond the absolute being of 
absolute identity'93 and consists in the asymmetrical and irreversible self-differentiation of 
identity. What applies to one essence – that it is its own act94 – applies therefore to all. The 
Freiheitsschrift’s famous equation 'willing is primal being',95 means that whatever is, operates as 
'real self-positing, a primal willing of the ground which makes itself into something and is the 
ground of all essentiality [Wesenheit]'.96 What is essential in essence is that it is inseparable from 
the structure of willing, of being 'on the verge of being'. Possibility, then, is not the ground of 
freedom, but of nature. Essence is therefore the act or operation by which something arises from 
what it is not, or creation. It is because creation – not only in the sense of what is created but also 
in its act, its 'being wirksam', that is, effective, its wesen-ing – is nature that the 'completed 




3. The Prior has its Actuality in the Consequent97 
 
Schelling’s essay ‘Ist einer Philosophie der Geschichte möglich?’ (1797) provides an early 
constellation of the problems driving Schelling’s naturephilosophy, and in particular of the status 
of possibility in nature. Its problematic, however, is also what preoccupies the Freiheitsschrift, 
namely, the conjoint hypotheses that, first, if freedom or Selbstmacht is to exist at all, its roots 
must 'lie in the independent grounds of nature'.98 For Geschichte, 'nature in its freedom' is evident 
as it 'develops along all possible trajectories' insofar as 'all possible trajectories' makes it 
                                                                                                                                                        
85   '[N]owhere does it appear as if order and form were what is original but rather as it the initial 
unruly had been brought to order' (SW I/7, 359; PI 34). 
86   As Heidegger (1971: 119) notes, in the Freiheitschrift, 'Wesen is not meant in the sense of the 
‘essence’ of a thing [Sache]', echoing Schelling: 'thing' is the most 'abstract concept of essences in the world 
[Weltwesen]' (SW I/7, 349; PI 22, t.m.) 
87   Band, SW I/2, 375 
88   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 362; PI 37, t.m. 
89   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 361; PI 36 
90   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 345; PI 18 
91   Darstellung SW I/4, 145; PR 164 
92   Darstellung SW I/4, 129; PR 154 
93   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 358; PI 32; cf. SW I/4, 203; PR 199 
94   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 385; PI 63 
95   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 350; PI 24 
96   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 385; PI 63 
97   Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie SW II/1, 375, paraphrasing Aristotle De anima 414b29-30: 
“the earlier type always exists potentially in that which follows”. 
98   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 371; PI 47, t.m. 
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'absolutely impossible' to determine a trajectory a priori.99 A trajectory is not free, that is, insofar 
as it is possible, but insofar as it is actual, so that it is the actual free trajectory that is indeterminable 
a priori – certainly 'relatively, in relation to ourselves', but not, Schelling cautions, 'absolutely'.100 
In other words, the problem of an actually free trajectory in nature is pinioned on its absolute 
determinability as free. 
Second therefore, the requirement that philosophy (conceived, in 1796, as an a priori 
science) of natural history (there conceived as an a posteriori science) must conceive nature not 
only in the form of the repeated 'cycle of acts'101 constitutive of animal species or individuals, 
that is, as 'things… the abstract concept of Weltwesen',102 but in its development. If nature’s 
freedom is the full development of all possible trajectories, natural history does not follow a 
trajectory from possible to actual, because nothing is possible outside nature.103 Nature, that is, 
comprises actuality and all possibility. Yet nature is not nature without what the History essay 
calls 'progressivity',104 i.e., without all possible developmental pathways, nor without what the 
Freiheitsschrift calls true consequents, i.e. consequents independent of their antecedents, nor again 
without true antecedence, i.e., without creation. Accordingly, if nature is possible but not 
determinable a priori, natural possibility may be defined as the degree to which potency is 'raised 
to actus' in 'creation in operation [wirklichen Schöpfung]'.105 This is not the becoming-actual of the 
possible but rather the degree of raising in which the acts that potency performs consist; the 
raising, in other words, is the actuality, the effectiveness of potency, or possibility is operativity at 
zero potency, operativity without operation. 
While the Geschichte’s formulation of the problem of determinability arising from 
indetermination, cast in relative terms ('in relation to ourselves'), prompts the question as to the 
relation of the a priori to the a posteriori sciences, in its non-relative or absolute form, it asks 
after the emergence of determinate trajectory from all possible trajectories. As the Freiheitsschrift 
says, however, 'possibility does not comprise actuality, and this is really the main obstacle 
[Gegenstand] in question'.106 As we have seen, while the law of the ground explains the origin of 
position from dimensionless potency as such, ground does not explain dimensionlessness, 
because that law applies also to ground itself: 'the essence of ground… can only be what 
precedes all ground'.107 The question of essence, or of the ontological state consequent upon its 
operativity or actuality, its Wirkungsweisen,108 is precisely the question of how what is emerges 
from what was not what it now is, or, for example, how understanding emerges from what is 
without understanding, order from ataxia, ground from its antecedent. 
Accordingly, the law of the ground entails that auto-positioning that is Selbstmacht be 
explained from the dimensionless, or ground from unground. In accordance with that law, the 
Unground is primal ground (Urgrund) not because it is ground itself, but because it is that essence 
                                                 
99   ‘Ist eine Philosophie der Geschichte möglich?’ (hereafter Geschichte) SW I/1, 469-470 
100   Geschichte, SW I/1, 470 
101   Geschichte, SW I/, 470 
102   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 349; 22 
103   As Schelling writes in the System des tranzsendentalen Idealismus, “Anything whose conditions simply 
cannot be given in nature, must be absolutely impossible.” SW I/3, 571, tr. Peter Heath, System of Transcendental 
Idealism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978, 186 
104   Geschichte I, 470 
105   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 398; PI 78 
106   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 373; PI 49, t.m. 
107   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 407; PI 88-89 
108   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 409; PI 90, t.m. 
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that 'precedes all ground and all existence'. Just as Schelling is clear that unground is the not-
being (Nichtsein) of all antithesis and therefore does not contain them, so auto-positioning 
(Selbstsetzen) is ‘auto’ because it does not actualise a position already given or contained in the 
unground, since the latter is itself the not-being of position or trajectory, a non-dimensionality, 
but rather positioning itself. When therefore the Freiheitsschrift defines the task of a 'completed 
naturephilosophy' as 'to show how each succeeding process approaches closer to the essence of 
nature, until the innermost centre unfolds into the highest division of forces',109 the problem is 
precisely stated. The innermost centre of nature cannot be located insofar as it may be occupied by 
any existent, that is, according to a consequent or a posteriori metric, such as an animal act-cycle, 
the above and below, right and left, behind and before by which Aristotle locates the relative 
dimensionality of human being,110 or the beginning, middle, and end that give the dimensions of 
process.111 To attempt this location is to pose the 'question of the ground of dimensionality'.112 
Since according to the law of the ground, ground is not self-grounding, but rather auto-
positioning forms place from the 'placeless',113 unground is the necessary antecedent of the 
origins of dimensionality or the emergence of ground. 
 It was this that so shocked Eschenmayer; yet as he noted, there is nothing here that 
would strike an astrophysicist or a geologist as bizarre. The earth, for example, rests on nothing 
but the homeostasis issuing from the real opposition of gravitational forces. Its formation is not 
the slow development of a seed, but the reduplicated development, the 'wiederholte Entfaltung',114 
or the division of these forces from which the vital bond arises. Just as Schelling rejects the 
actualisation of potentiality as the model of development, neither does the first precede the 
second that patiently awaits actualisation in a presently expanding series; rather, essence – the 
reciprocal but asymmetrical deposition of ground by existence – overpowers itself, is potentiated 
beyond its current state, and so acquires a past, a prior it cannot recover in accordance with the 
law of the ground. 
 The explanation of the emergence or construction of dimensionality had become the 
overt objective of the naturephilosophy since the Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Prozesses 
(1800). The law of the ground entails that dimension is created from that which is without 
dimension. That law, as we have seen, governs the co-articulation of antecedence and 
consequence and, due to the asymmetry attendant upon the ultimate consequence of that law, 
namely, that unground is prior to all ground, the emergence of antecedence and consequence 
from what was without these, now is these, and will consist in their consequents. The 'innermost 
centre of nature' is therefore precisely the emergence of dimensionality from the non-
dimensional; how process or 'becoming', the only concept 'adequate to the nature of things',115 
becomes the actuality of the prior in the consequent.116 This is the task confronting a complete 
                                                 
109   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 362; PI 37 
110   Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 284b21-30, cited Schelling, Einleitung in der Philosophie der 
Mythologie, SW II/1, 439. 
111   Aristotle, On the Heavens 268a6-13, cited Schelling SW II/1, 434. 
112   Einleitung in der Philosophie der Mythologie SW II/1, 435 
113   Band SW I/2, 364 
114   Band SW I/2, 375 
115   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 358-9; PI 33 
116   Einleitung in der Philosophie der Mythologie SW II/1, 375 
14 
 
philosophy of nature: the emergence of emergence following the becoming proper to Wesen, the 
γένεσιν είς ούσίαν that already formed the central problem of Schelling’s Timaeus commentary.117 
 With a view to such completeness, Bruce Matthews has recently argued that 'life as the 
schema of freedom' should be taken as the 'metric' Schelling introduces for Wesen’s becomings.118 
Such a view is consonant with the idea of Schelling turning, in the Freiheitschrift, from a 
naturalistic to a hermeneutic119 or analogical120 naturephilosophy according to which, for 
example, gravity and light are analogies for stages in the development of a free essence, rather 
than ground’s own 'self-operation'.121 The Freiheitsschrift’s claim that the vital bond constitutes 'the 
centre of forces' seems to confirm and support this view: 
 
The forces separated (but not completely sundered) in this division are the material from 
which the body will later be configured; but the vital bond that arises in this division, from 
the depths of the natural ground, as the midpoint of the forces is the soul.122 
 
Yet two things complicate the matter. Firstly, life or the vital bond 'arises' from the division 
of forces as their centre, the measure introduced into the dimensionless Potenzzustand from which 
in turn dimension emerges. Because the law of the ground entails that what arises does so from 
what is not it, nature is not reducible to life. While it may be retorted that a centre is not only 
geometrical but also temporal, i.e., that from which a past emerges for that essence, the emergent 
past cannot represent the recovery of the unground that precedes all ground, and therefore all 
division of ground and existence that is the operation of essence. This is why no animal act-cycle, 
as in Gesechichte, nor any dimensional coordinates consequent upon what exists, such as the 
anthropic form advocated by Aristotle for this purpose and which Schelling discusses in the 
Einleitung in der Philosophie der Mythologie, can constitute the measure of nature, which consists in all 
trajectories. Dimension, in other words, can only arise from the dimensionless. 
 The second complication concerns the emergence and development of 'schema', that is, 
the nature of the concept and the emergence of understanding rather than only its form. Since 
the Freiheitsschrift is explicit that the understanding is not exempt from the law of the ground, that 
it derives, in other words from an irreversible division from what is without understanding; the 
understanding’s form is not to be found in an echo of itself, but in the divisions that precede and 
do not resemble it. It is therefore to the ground-consequent structure that, according to the 
Freiheitsschrift, phusis exhibits as logos,123 that we now turn. 
 
 
                                                 
117   Timaeus, H. Buchner, hrsg. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994, 63-4. 
118   See Bruce Matthews’ excellent and rewarding study, Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the 
Schema of Freedom. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011. 
119   See Dale E. Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1996, 67-92 and Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. New York and London: Routledge, 1993, 
30-44, for the “hermeneutics of nature”. 
120   Heidegger, 1971, 137-9, defends an analogical reading of the naturephilosophy, with support 
from the Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 358; PI 32-3, and “justifying” such comparisons on the basis of the essential identity 
of the terms forming the analogy. 
121   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 381; PI 58, t.m. 
122   Freiheitsschrift SW I/7, 362 
123   'Light or the ideal principle is, as the eternal antithesis of the dark principle, the creating word 




4. Understanding and Unground: the Generation of Orders in the 
Dimensionless 
 
[T]he conviction that all thought and knowledge are completely subjective and that Nature 
altogether lacks reason and thought [meant that] the dynamic factor… was in no sense 
recognised in its identity with the spiritual.124 
 
Contrary to Tilliette’s dismissal of the claim that the Freiheitschrift is a 'remake' of the 
Naturphilosophie,125 we have seen that Schelling’s naturephilosophy undergoes substantial revision 
there. The ‘ungrounding’ of essence onto creation; the derivation of systems of cognition from 
'the system of the world'126 or the necessary connection of the former with the latter;127 nature as 
the 'older revelation';128 all demonstrate precisely the being 'in another',129 without which nothing 
is and by which essence generates structures. The nature thus remade in accordance with the law 
of the ground is extended not merely ontically, that is, in the addition of new objects or things 
(word, spirit, etc.), but also ontologically, since any nature whatever necessarily embraces the 
dimensionless non-being or Potenzzustand in the division of which, since nature is 'all being [alles 
Seyn]',130 becoming issues. 
We have seen that essence consists not in things but in its two modes of operation or, 
following Heidegger, its two 'dimensions'.131 It is the non-sundering division of forces by means 
of which the vital bond arises, like the wedge that holds the split log open, conjoining ground 
and existence as it potentiates in each direction, just as it creates them. The law of the ground is 
therefore the amplification of tension in identity or the emergence of dimension in the 
dimensionless. The completed philosophy of nature must seek in the 'highest division of forces' 
for 'the ground of dimensionality' as the 'innermost centre of nature'. 
Up to this point, the law of the ground maintains the positive by the repeated 
development of divisions until it comes to the undivided Potenzzustand requisite to essential 
becoming. From this anterior or Unground [Ur- oder vielmehr Ungrund],132 division arises positively, 
that is, unprecedentedly or asymmetrically: even that the Unground itself divides133 and, each 
being whole or positive, divides again, is a consequence of rather than antecedent to, its own 
essence. Wherever therefore there is division, there is maintained positivity, so that separation is 
not sundering but repeated development. When therefore the understanding is said to have as its 
'first effect in nature' the 'division of forces', the understanding is treated in accordance with the 
law of the ground as an existing consequent upon its grounding, or upon the division of forces 
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in which its activity consists. Hence it is the Freiheitsschrift’s account of the understanding as 
consequent and asymmetrical with respect to its ground that means the latter 'irreducibly 
remains' following the exhaustion of the understanding’s operations. The law of the ground, in 
other words, is not a version of the principle of sufficient reason because it does not belong to 
the understanding, as a concept wielded by it over a domain reducible to it, but rather belongs to 
the mode of operation of ground itself. It is because ground is a 'self-operating' that is or acts 
following its own necessity, that it constitutes a Gegenstand for the understanding, standing against 
it as resistance, rather than furnishing the understanding with an object proper to its own 
domain. The antecedence of forces to their division is therefore the condition under which alone 
the understanding can arise, and arise as positively restricted by what exceeds it but to which it 
belongs as to its own medium or nature. 
From this, we gain a crucial insight into the nature of the Schellingian concept. Like the 
thesis of inductive identity in the Ideas, repeated under Empedoclean guise at the outset of the 
Freiheitsschrift,134 by which necessity is accorded to the formation of concepts; and as in the 
Begründung der positiven Philosophie towards the end of Schelling’s career, the becoming universal to 
all being that arrives at consciousness arises asymmetrically to a self-consciousness which, 
precisely because it is self-consciousness, is 'not equal to the consciousness of nature'.135 Thus 
concepts remain free products of their genesis, and thus act according to an 'independent power' 
against their immediate generative source in 'the soul'.136 
This is why the word is 'spoken out into nature'137 rather than over it. Due to the law of the 
ground, the word does not recover its antecedent divisions as proto-semantic but repeats them 
as directionality 'into' a nature that is gegenständlich for it, i.e., that stands against and so forms it. 
The law of the ground thus gives word and world a common medium in the essence or 
operativity by which each works in another. Essence therefore is the recursion of operations in 
each, the 'universe in the universe'138 or the innermost centre of nature. 
That therefore the community of forces remains positive, unsundered, in the emergence 
of the understanding from what does not have it, is a precisely directed critique of the 
transcendental character of the understanding. The partiality of the concept is a consequence of 
its irreducible particularity and its dynamic community precisely because it does not have an 
origin or source separable either from the becoming universal in all being or from the Gegenstand 
of which, qua concept, it is the consequent. The Unground does not sanction, therefore, a 
reworking of the cognitive division between the knowable and the unknowable 'relative to 
ourselves', but rather, because it is Urgrund or ground’s antecedent, an account of the 
understanding’s Umwelt, a ground that, as its own, it cannot master and reduce. 
The Freiheitsschrift’s 'generative dialectic'139 of the understanding therefore maintains its 
positivity in the sense that its actualisation pathways open it ultimately to the Ur- and Unground 
it cannot recover, on the one hand, and thus demonstrates in turn why the understanding 
produces effects in the nature with which it maintains dynamic community, and thus 
demonstrates the 'identity' of dynamics and spirit that the Freiheitsschrift early announces as its 
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elucidatory objective (SW I/7, 333; PI 3). This, in the end, is why the Freiheitsschrift extends the 
law of identity into a law of the ground. That nature is what exceeds identity does not tell us what 
but how nature is. Namely, as essence or the total set of operations of all possibilities (“alle Wesen” 
are “alle Möglichkeiten”, SW II/1, 585) or essence according to all powers. The law of the ground 
makes identity 'creative' (SW I/7, 345; PI 18), potentiating the division of grounding in existing. 
What is it, finally, that Verstand understands? As the containing is higher than the 
contained,140 the understanding’s consequents – concepts – contain what they conceive. Since 
the container cannot be contained by what it contains, the understanding is logically higher than 
its content (nature, or the divisions of prius from posterius; ground from consequent) but 
identical according to essence and differentiated in accordance with power (higher/lower). That is, 
the content of the concept is not the Gegenstand but the divisions that articulate the dimensions in 
which Gegenstände form systems. Logical orders, then, do not rise over nature since nature is 
nothing other than the self-division of essence into ground and existence. Rather they rise from it, 
so that the content of such an order is not this ground and that existent but the movements that 
divide, the potencies that intensify the division, and the dimensions to which these give rise. As 
the Philosophie der Mythologie puts it, reiterating the Freiheitsschrift’s claim that 'Urseyn ist Wollen', 
'willing is not only the beginning but also the content of the first emergent'.141 What is conceived 
in the concept is essence, the operation or act that grounds and exceeds the consequent that its 
concept is, a past or a prius therefore 'that cannot be resolved into understanding [Verstand]'.142 
When, accordingly, the effect of the understanding in nature is characterised as the 'unity hidden 
in the ground and containing all rais[ing] itself up',143 this does not therefore mean that in the 
end, ground is contained in the understanding, but rather that the all in the understanding (unity 
revealed) is lesser in extent than the all in ground (unity hidden) from which division the former 
arises. Yet it is the form of these motions that yields their systematic interconnection, the 
'universe in the universe', via the law of the ground: the understanding arises from what is 
without it, just as logical orders entail the irreducibility of the ataxia in which they divide. Because 
the unity of the understanding arises in division, it conceives, by means of the division from 
which it derives, the unity of the divisions it contains along with the dynamic community (the 
positivity of division) from which it arises. 
 What is consequent upon the understanding therefore is nature (excess over identity) 
understood in accordance with power – the structures and formations by which forces articulate 
emergent and developing potentiations or auto-positings from what has, at the beginning, no 
dimensionality, the morphogenesis alone adequate to nature. It should be emphasised, however, 
that the present essay has proceeded only so far as the analysis of Selbständigkeit and its resistants; 
a free philosophy, like free mathematics, issues in a production of nature of which nature is 
subject but not, for that very reason, identical to its outcome. 
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